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A coordinate transformation framework for understanding how neurons compute
sensorimotor behaviors has generated significant advances toward our understanding
of basic brain function. This influential scaffold focuses on neuronal encoding of
spatial information represented in different coordinate systems (e.g., eye-centered,
hand-centered) and how multiple brain regions partake in transforming these signals in
order to ultimately generate a motor output. A powerful analogy can be drawn from
the coordinate transformation framework to better elucidate how the nervous system
computes cognitive variables for social behavior. Of particular relevance is how the brain
represents information with respect to oneself and other individuals, such as in reward
outcome assignment during social exchanges, in order to influence social decisions. In
this article, I outline how the coordinate transformation framework can help guide our
understanding of neural computations resulting in social interactions. Implications for
numerous psychiatric disorders with impaired representations of self and others are also
discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
The brains of many animals have evolved to deal with an increas-
ing demand for complex social interactions. Interacting with
other members in large social groups requires neural represen-
tations to be dynamically updated with respect to oneself as well
as with respect to other individuals in order to adjust ongoing
social behaviors. Even a simple interaction with another indi-
vidual requires an accurate tracking of actions and outcomes
referenced to self and others. Explorations into how the brain
computes information necessary to guide social behaviors can
thus reveal ecologically valid insights into neural mechanisms
underlying complex cognition that might not be tractable oth-
erwise. One might even argue that probing the brain function
using socially relevant behavioral tasks is a preferred way to
unlock the mystery of “high-level” cognition in highly social
species. Furthermore, a failure to accurately represent self and
others can result in atypical social behaviors like those that are
striking in autism (Baron-Cohen, 1988) and Williams syndrome
(Jones et al., 2000), as well as in schizophrenia (Jeannerod, 2008),
borderline personality disorders (Bender and Skodol, 2007) and
psychopathy (Hare, 1999). Investigating the neural mechanisms
underlying social interactions will therefore provide critical clues
toward characterizing the neural basis of a surprisingly large
number of neuropsychiatric disorders that are accompanied by
social deficits.
Since the early beginning, a major focus in the field of sys-
tems neuroscience has been to understand how perception and
action are encoded by individual neurons (Goodale and Milner,
1992), and how these signals are transformed across different
neural networks (Salinas and Abbott, 1995; Colby, 1998; Colby
and Goldberg, 1999). A coding scheme of a neuron conveys precise
computational principles used in transforming a signal encoded
under one coordinate system into a signal encoded under a
different coordinate system (Andersen et al., 1993; Pouget and
Sejnowski, 1997; Pouget and Snyder, 2000; Snyder, 2000; Groh,
2001; Crawford, 2004). An immense body of work has enhanced
our understanding of sensorimotor behavior, such as motor plan-
ning and attention, by framing these computational tasks in terms
of coordinate transformations.
Here I propose that applying a coordinate transformation
model to the social domain can provide novel insights into the
neural mechanisms underlying social interactions. In particular,
a coordinate transformation approach to social interactions is
useful for unraveling how neurons across different brain regions
contribute to social interactions by framing their responses as
cognitive states with respect to self and others.
COORDINATE TRANSFORMATION FRAMEWORK
A frame of reference refers to the coding scheme of a neuron rep-
resenting information in specific coordinates (Groh, 2001; Cohen
and Andersen, 2002). For example, a neuron is considered to use
an eye-centered, or retinocentric, frame of reference when this
neuron encodes a spatial location relative to a location on the
retina (Batista et al., 1999; Avillac et al., 2005; Marzocchi et al.,
2008; Chang and Snyder, 2010). This means that the receptive
field of this neuron is anchored to the retinal location. On the con-
trary, a neuron may use an arm-centered reference frame when
the neuron represents spatial location relative to a location on
the arm (Kalaska et al., 1989; Caminiti et al., 1991; Scott and
Kalaska, 1997; Schwartz et al., 2004; Batista et al., 2007; Chang
and Snyder, 2010). Other documented reference frames include
world-centered (information is encoded relative to a location
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in the world) (O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978; Snyder et al., 1998)
and object-centered (relative to a certain feature of an object)
(Olson and Gettner, 1995). It is important to note that not all
reference frames are tightly coupled to specific body parts or
well-defined location in the world, making some reference frames
hard to interpret. For instance, some representations could be
more accurately described as “intermediate,” that is, referenced
to a position in between different body parts or different specific
locations in the environment. Indeed, converging experimental
evidence has documented such added complexity in neuronal ref-
erence frames (Mullette-Gillman, 2005; Chang and Snyder, 2010;
McGuire and Sabes, 2011). Furthermore, depending on the goal
of the transformation, there exists a final frame of reference for
directly influencing a motor output. For instance, for visually-
guided reaching, the representation eventually needs to be in an
intrinsic muscle- or joint-centered frame of reference (Kalaska
et al., 1989; Scott and Kalaska, 1997) in order to drive the arm
at the end of the transformation pathway (Shadmehr and Wise,
2005).
One of the powerful aspects of characterizing the reference
frames employed by individual neurons is that it provides us
with a relatively straightforward way to understand how differ-
ent computational stages (roughly analogous to different brain
areas) transform one type of a representation into another
(Andersen et al., 1993; Pouget and Sejnowski, 1997; Pouget and
Snyder, 2000; Snyder, 2000; Groh, 2001; Crawford, 2004). A
next stage of computation might involve yet another coordinate
transformation, depending on the purpose of the transforma-
tion (Andersen et al., 1993). A simulation in Figure 1 illustrates
a popular example of coordinate transformation from an eye-
centered to a head-centered frame of reference. This example
computes the transformation using a gain field (i.e., multiplica-
tive influence on neuronal tuning), which seems to be ubiqui-
tously present across many brain regions (Salinas and Thier, 2000;
Salinas and Sejnowski, 2001). Let us consider an eye-centered
neuron (Figure 1A), like a neuron in area 7a (Andersen and
Mountcastle, 1983), that monotonically modulates firing rates to
changes in eye position (i.e., an eye position gain field, Figure 1B).
When the eye-centered tuning is multiplied by the eye posi-
tion gain field, a head-centered tuning begins to emerge (i.e.,
providing a basis for a population code that can be read out
as head-centered) (Figure 1C). Various neural network models
(Zipser and Andersen, 1988; Salinas and Abbott, 1996; Pouget
and Snyder, 2000; Blohm et al., 2008) can efficiently perform
this computation. If necessary for a given behavior, when a head-
centered representation is multiplied by a head position gain
field (Brotchie et al., 1995), yet another representation begins to
emerge, namely a population code that can be read out as body-
centered (Andersen et al., 1993; Snyder et al., 1998). Another
example of coordinate transformation concerns directly convert-
ing (i.e., without the necessity of the serial steps as discussed in the
previous example) an eye-centered representation of a reach tar-
get into an arm-centered representation by the reaching-related
neurons. In the parietal reach region (PRR) of the primate pos-
terior parietal cortex, this transformation can occur when the
eye-centered representation of the hand, encoded using a com-
pound eye and hand gain field specifying the distance between
FIGURE 1 | A simulation of a gain field mediated coordinate
transformation. (A) A neuron encoding target locations using an
eye-centered frame of reference, when the eyes are straight ahead. (B) The
same neuron showing an eye position gain field. The responses are shown
for a target straight ahead of and aligned with the eyes. The responses are
monotonically scaled by changes in eye position (eyes-on-head). For this
particular example neuron, the activity increases by 1.0 spikes/sec (sp/s) for
each visual degree of rightward change in eye position. Different colored
points represent different eye positions. (C) Multiplying the eye-centered
tuning curve with different eye positions. Each colored curve represents a
tuning curve obtained by multiplying the eye-centered tuning from (A) with
each eye position from (B) (in corresponding colors). When the eye position
is at 0, that is, the same position as the plot in (A), the tuning does not
change (indicated by the thick black traces in A and C). However, when the
eye positions change, the tuning curves now scale and shift according to
the eye position gain field. These multiplicative interactions result in target
representations that can be read out in a head-centered frame of reference;
now the responses are tuned relative to the head.
the eyes and the hand (Chang et al., 2009), is effectively vectorially
subtracted from the eye-centered representation of the reach tar-
get, resulting in the hand-centered target representation (Bullock
and Grossberg, 1988; Buneo et al., 2002; Chang et al., 2009).
SELECTED THEORIES OF COORDINATE TRANSFORMATIONS
In this section, I will discuss two influential theories of coordi-
nate transformation. By analogy, these contrasting theories can
help guide how we interpret neuronal encoding and how such
encoded variables are computed during social interactions. One
theory focuses on systematic representations of neuronal vari-
ables (as in engineering a specific circuit based on a specific
set of rules), whereas the other focuses on idiosyncratic neu-
ronal representations (as in carrying out network-like operations
using an artificial intelligence). For convenience, hereafter I will
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refer to them as the engineering approach and the connectionist
approach, respectively.
From the classical engineering perspective, purpose-built net-
works are designed to compute highly specific quantities under
strict rules. This engineering approach emphasizes that every
neural representation serves a specific functional purpose using
precise quantities. As a classic example, areas 7a neurons not only
represent eye-centered target location but also show eye position
gain fields (Andersen and Mountcastle, 1983), thereby providing
a basis for a population code that can be read out as head-
centered using a multiplicative interaction between eye-centered
tuning and an eyes-on-head position signal (Figure 1) (Zipser
and Andersen, 1988). Although such systematicity may restrict
flexibility in creating novel representations for which the system is
not initially designed to compute (but it remains unclear what the
biological consequences might be), it is associated with extremely
efficient computational performance.
On the contrary, an artificial intelligence field emphasizes
the use of neural networks that contain multiple non-linear
combinations of signals that are eventually self-organized in
order to generate a particular information (Poggio, 1990). Such
networks based on the connectionist approach have been suc-
cessfully applied to perform coordinate transformations (Pouget
and Sejnowski, 1997; Pouget and Snyder, 2000). Desired rela-
tionships of input and output variables may emerge from the
hidden layer of such models (e.g., Chang et al., 2009). A connec-
tionist approach suggests that diverse representations are com-
mon, and the vast majority of computations may appear highly
obscure. Strong empirical evidence in support of the connection-
ist approach is the presence of intermediate neuronal representa-
tions. Intermediate reference frames, which are particular types
of intermediary representations, are often desired for computa-
tional flexibility (Pouget and Sejnowski, 1997; Pouget and Snyder,
2000; Xing andAndersen, 2000; Blohm et al., 2008). Indeed, inter-
mediate reference frames have been found across neurons in the
lateral intraparietal area (LIP) (Mullette-Gillman, 2005), the ven-
tral intraparietal area (VIP) (Avillac et al., 2005), PRR (Chang
and Snyder, 2010), the dorsal area 5 (McGuire and Sabes, 2011),
the dorsal medial superior temporal area (MSTd) (Fetsch et al.,
2007), as well as the dorsal premotor cortex (PMd) (Batista et al.,
2007). In exchange for high flexibility, such connectionist com-
putations require high dimensional space, potentially demanding
much more resources.
REFERENCE FRAMES DURING SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
A successful social interaction requires an accurate understand-
ing of self and others. Such representations of self and others
can take many forms in the brain, including the agency underly-
ing particular perceptual or emotional events (Ruby and Decety,
2004; Amodio and Frith, 2006; Mitchell et al., 2006; Singer, 2006;
Ochsner et al., 2008), during action observation (Wolpert et al.,
2003), and for learning and decision-making (Behrens et al.,
2009). Here one can draw an analogy from the coordinate trans-
formation framework, and apply it toward understanding the
neural mechanisms of social interactions.
The analogy can be made based on the following criteria. First,
as for representing sensory or motor information in a specific
coordinate system for sensorimotor computations, representa-
tions of social information must be referenced to a specific agent
(e.g., self, other, in-group, or out-group, etc.) involved in social
interactions. Otherwise, normal social interactions simply would
not be possible. So, the concept of reference frame is useful for
social computations. Accumulating evidence suggests the pres-
ence of social reference frames during social behavior (Behrens
et al., 2008; Yoshida et al., 2011, 2012; Chang et al., 2013). Second,
similar to gain-modulated spatial representations during senso-
rimotor computations, social representations are systematically
enhanced or attenuated according to behaviorally-relevant social
variables (e.g., social status, familiarity). For example, studies
have shown that social status and other social category modu-
late the gain of neuronal activity (Klein et al., 2008; Azzi et al.,
2012;Watson and Platt, 2012). In this view, the concept of coordi-
nate transformation using gainmodulations could be analogously
applied to social computations. Taken together, transforming spa-
tial signals from one coordinate system to another is analogous to
transforming agent-independent signals into agent-specific sig-
nals, or converting signals referenced to one type of agent to
another.
In what way can neuronal variables represented during social
interactions be considered as having reference frames? Let us con-
sider a simple scenario in which two individuals, agent A and
agent B, are playing an afternoon chess at a park. For every
move that is made, agent A needs to keep track of the actions of
both himself and agent B as well as the outcomes for themselves
resulting from each move. Agent B also does the same to have
a chance at winning. These actions and outcomes tightly cou-
pled to either agent A or B during their competitive exchanges
must be reflected in their neuronal signals. More precisely, these
variables with respect to self and others need to be either dif-
ferentiated or coincided during different stages of computations.
Although the above example focused on a competitive interac-
tion, tracking self and others’ actions and outcomes is similarly
importantly for cooperative transactions, such as when agents A
and B need to coordinate steering to the right on a canoe to avoid
a rock in their way. Furthermore, it is natural to consider that
inaccurate or unstable representations of social variables across
self- and other-centered frames of reference may directly underlie
many of the social deficits observed in multiple psychiatric con-
ditions (see below). It is worthwhile to emphasize, however, that
applying the coordinate transformation framework based on spa-
tial reference frames to cognitive domains is an analogy by nature
simply because cognitive computations, like those involved in
social cognition, are fundamentally different from the sensorimo-
tor computations using the receptive field or place code. Rather,
the analogy is beneficial for understanding how social variables
represented in different dimensions (e.g., self versus others) are
used to mediate social interactions.
Reward-guided social learning and decision-making have been
critical for investigating neural basis of social behaviors (King-
Casas et al., 2005; Moll et al., 2006; Behrens et al., 2008, 2009;
Mobbs et al., 2009; Jeon et al., 2010; Yoshida et al., 2011, 2012;
Azzi et al., 2012; Carter et al., 2012; Hillman and Bilkey, 2012;
Kishida and Montague, 2012; Nicolle et al., 2012; Watson and
Platt, 2012; Chang et al., 2013). Given that social interactions are
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largely reward-driven (Fehr and Camerer, 2007), it is not surpris-
ing that self- and other-referenced signals are robustly present
in reward-related brain regions. Taking inspiration from work
in reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998), vicarious
reinforcement (Berber, 1962; Bandura et al., 1963), neuroeco-
nomics (Platt and Huettel, 2008), and game theory (Lee, 2008),
researchers have begun the quest to identify neural correlates of
social learning and decision-making (Sanfey, 2007; Behrens et al.,
2009; Seo and Lee, 2012; Rushworth et al., 2013). One common
goal for this expedition has been to elucidate how different brain
regions compute social variables with respect to self and others.
Another shared aim of this quest, which will not be discussed
here, has been to identify whether there are neural circuits ded-
icated to social cognition (Carter et al., 2012; Rushworth et al.,
2013).
Recent studies are beginning to unravel how self- and other-
referenced computations are computed across multiple brain
regions. Using behavioral tasks involving interacting rhesus mon-
keys, single-neuron recording studies from reward-sensitive areas,
such as the anterior cingulate gyrus (ACCg), anterior cingu-
late sulcus (ACCs), orbitofrontal (OFC) cortices, and the regions
in the medial frontal cortex (MFC), have characterized how
individual neurons modulate activity with respect to events
occurring to self and others (Yoshida et al., 2011, 2012; Azzi et al.,
2012; Chang et al., 2013). Yoshida and colleagues reported that
a group of primate MFC neurons selectively encode actions in
other-centered frame of reference (Yoshida et al., 2011), and that
some MFC neurons encode self-referenced reward-omission sig-
nals or other-referenced error signals (others’ erroneous actions)
(Yoshida et al., 2012). Azzi and colleagues reported that primate
OFC neurons modulate activity according to whether rewards
are shared with another monkey or received only by the actor
monkey (Azzi et al., 2012). Using fully dissociated self and
other reward outcomes, Chang and colleagues reported that
primate OFC neurons signal actors’ received rewards in a self-
centered frame of reference (Figure 2A), whereas ACCs neurons
signal actors’ foregone rewards (rewards that are either omit-
ted or delivered to another) in a self-centered frame of reference
(Figure 2B) (Chang et al., 2013). In contrast, in addition to
OFC-like self-referenced reward neurons, some ACCg neurons
selectively signal others’ received rewards in other-centered frame
of reference (Figure 2C), while others signal actors’ received and
others’ received rewards in a common, or both-centered, frame
of reference (Figure 2D) (Chang et al., 2013). Furthermore, in
FIGURE 2 | Schematic and empirical examples of reward outcomes
represented in different frames of reference during social interactions.
Illustrative peri-stimulus time histograms (PSTHs) (top of each panel) show
the activity of an individual reward-sensitive neuron aligned to the time of
reward. The PSTHs displayed on the bottom of each panel (in the gray box)
show the activity of a single neuron recorded from different regions of the
primate frontal cortex during a social reward-allocation task [modified with
permission from Chang et al. (2013)] that corresponds to the illustrative
PSTHs above. The brain region from which each neuron was recorded is
highlighted on the right (in yellow). cgs, cingulate sulcus; lorb, lateral
orbitofrontal sulcus; morb, medial orbitofrontal sulcus; ps, principal sulcus.
(A) Self-referenced representation of actor’s received rewards. The majority
of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) neurons employ this coding scheme. (B)
Self-referenced representation of actor’s foregone rewards. The majority of
neurons located in the sulcus of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACCs) employ
this coding scheme. (C) Other-referenced representation of rewards allocated
to another monkey in the room. A group of neurons in the gyrus of the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACCg) employs this coding scheme. (D) Common
(both-referenced) representation of rewards received by an actor and another
monkey. A group of ACCg neurons employs this coding scheme.
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humans, Nicolle and colleagues reported that self- and other-
referenced decision signals in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC) and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) flexibly
switch their coding schemes such that vmPFC always track rel-
evant choices (for whom a choice is being made) and dmPFC
always track irrelevant choices (for whom a choice is not being
made) (Nicolle et al., 2012). Together, these results provide novel
intuitions into how different neural circuits encode self- and
other-referenced information during social interactions. At the
same time, they highlight that the remarkable flexibility in trans-
formations across the two representations, depending on task
demands.
APPLYING THE COORDINATE TRANSFORMATION
FRAMEWORK TO SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
A proposed schematic model in Figure 3 illustrates how self-
referenced, other-referenced, and commonly-referenced (both-
referenced) signals may arise from coordinate transformations
during social interactions. This model, like the models used
for the coordinate transformations for sensorimotor behaviors
(Zipser and Andersen, 1988; Salinas and Abbott, 1996; Blohm
et al., 2008; Chang et al., 2009), utilizes gain modulations (noted
as G in Figure 3) to transform signals represented in an agent-
nonspecific coordinate to a coordinate with respect to self, other,
or both. For example, added gain modulations based on a vari-
ety of self motivational variables can result in a self-referenced
representation, as reported in the primate OFC (actors’ received
rewards), ACCs (actors’ foregone rewards), and a subgroup of
ACCg neurons (actors’ received rewards) (Chang et al., 2013). On
the other hand, added gainmodulations based on other-regarding
variables can result in selectively other-referenced reward signals,
like those documented in a subgroup of ACCg neurons (Chang
et al., 2013), and other-referenced action and error signals, as
reported in MFC neurons (Yoshida et al., 2011, 2012). Examples
of self-regarding motivational variables include reward amount,
risk, uncertainty, expected utility, delay, and so on. In contrast,
examples of other-regarding motivational variables include social
relationship, reciprocity level, trustworthiness, generosity, and
so forth, in addition to the variables like those that drive self-
motivation but directed toward others. It is important to note
that social variables such as social relationship, reciprocity level,
trustworthiness, and generosity may also contain self-regarding
components since self motivations sometimes underlie other-
regarding motivations (e.g., Weinstein and Ryan, 2010). Thus,
the signals that drive other-regarding gain in the model should
correspond to other-referenced components of such complex social
variables.
Furthermore, for generating a both-referenced representa-
tion, the model assigns appropriate weights for self motivations
(noted as WS) and for other-regarding motivations (WO) to
account for the different strengths of modulations with respect
to self and others. This relative weighting offers a modula-
tory control over both-centered representations. For instance,
when the two weights are equal (WS = WO), the signals with
respect to self and other in the both-centered representations
will appear to be mirrored. In contrast, a greater influence of
self motivational signals (WS > WO) will result in a stronger
FIGURE 3 | A proposed schematic model of how social variables
represented in self- and other-centered, as well as common
(both-centered), frames of reference may mediate social interactions.
In the cognitive layer, neuronal signals resulting from the environment
(input layer) are represented in an agent-nonspecific frame of reference.
Motivational (and other cognitive) signals regarding oneself (self motivation
variables; see examples in the text) can be added using gain modulations
(G) to generate a representation in a self-centered frame of reference,
whereas motivational (and other cognitive) signals regarding others
(other-regarding and vicarious motivation variables; see examples in the
text) can be added using gain modulations to generate a representation in
an other-centered frame of reference. Neuromodulators (see examples in
the text) sets the gain parameters (e.g., magnitude, context) of self- and
other-regarding motivational signals in a context-dependent manner. Both
self- and other-regarding motivational signals can be added together using
gain modulations in a weighted manner (WS and WO , respectively) to result
in a representation in a common (both-centered) frame of reference. The
relative distribution of WS and WO determines the strength of self- and
other-regarding signals for the both-centered representation. The
self-centered signals directly influence self-regarding preferences (either
positive or negative in valence, +/−), whereas the other-centered signals
directly influence other-regarding preferences (either positive or negative in
valence). On the other hand, the commonly-referenced, both-centered,
signals may influence the self- and other-regarding preferences, and the
strength of each influence depends on WS and WO . The self- and
other-regarding preference signals are relayed to the output layer to
generate different social decisions and actions.
representation for the signals with respect to self in the both-
centered representation, whereas the opposite pattern is apparent
when there is a greater influence of other-regarding motivational
signals (WS < WO). Such computations may result in differen-
tially modulated activity corresponding to different social con-
texts, perhaps similar to what has been reported in OFC neurons
(Azzi et al., 2012).
Neuromodulators, such as oxytocin, norepinephrine,
dopamine, and testosterone, may set the gain parameters (e.g.,
magnitude, context) (Servan-Schreiber et al., 1990; Fellous and
Linster, 1998) of the self- and other-regarding variables in a
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context-dependent manner. Neuromodulators therefore may
directly gate when and how much of gain modulations are
taking place across different neural circuits (Dayan, 2012) for
both social and nonsocial behaviors. For instance, oxytocin,
known for its role in modulating social cognition (Donaldson
and Young, 2008), amplifies both self and vicarious reinforce-
ment (increases both red and green Gs in Figure 3) in rhesus
monkeys during social decision-making in a context-dependent
manner (Chang et al., 2012). It is worthwhile to emphasize that
neuromodulator action could be one of many ways to adjust
the gain parameters during social interactions. Furthermore, it
is expected that Gs in the model are sensitive to social context
signals, and different Gs might be independently controlled
by multiple sources. In this regard, the temporal dynamics
of neuromodulator-dependent gain control is important to
consider. In typical social interactions, it is often necessary
for neuronal representations of social variables (e.g., who is
being rewarded for a particular action) to alternate rapidly
between being referenced to self and another individual. Such fast
dynamics for rapid and flexible updating are likely to be medi-
ated by gain modulations by fast neurotransmission (e.g., via
AMPA or GABA receptors) or slightly slower (order of seconds)
G-protein-coupled neuromodulator action (e.g., oxytocin or
vasopressin). In contrast, an overall social state of an individual
(e.g., prosocial or antisocial tendency), whether it is typical or
pathological (e.g., attenuated social motivation in autism; see
Chevallier et al., 2012), is likely to change much more slowly by
comparison. Such longer-term dynamics are likely to be mediated
by an overall up- or down-regulation of neuromodulators and
their receptors. Finally, it is critical to point out that certain neu-
romodulators, like dopamine, are involved in both fast and slow
time scale depending on its functional contribution to behavior
(Schultz, 2007).
Similar to the heterogeneity of reference frames found for sen-
sorimotor behaviors (Mullette-Gillman, 2005; Chang and Snyder,
2010; McGuire and Sabes, 2011), it is likely that some brain
regions may concurrently represent social variables using mul-
tiple frames of reference. For instance, neural networks within
a given area may activate multiple pathways in the model. The
mixed self-, other-, and both-referenced social reward signals
found in ACCg support this view (Chang et al., 2013). However,
other areas like ACCs, which encodes actors’ foregone rewards
in a self-centered reference frame (Chang et al., 2013), seem
to represent information in a unified single frame of reference.
This might be analogous to some sensorimotor regions repre-
senting information primarily using a single frame of reference
(e.g., eye-centered tuning with an eye position gain field in the
primate V4; Bremmer, 2000). Furthermore, coding of informa-
tion in intermediate social reference frames is likely to be present
for computational flexibility. Finally, as in sensorimotor trans-
formations, social coordinate transformations might occur in
multiple directions. For example, self-referenced variables could
be transformed into other- or both-referenced variables, and vice
versa. Such flexibility, perhaps mediated by intermediate social
reference frames and gain modulations, would be beneficial for
rapidly updating representations across different social reference
frames.
INSIGHTS FOR SOCIAL COMPUTATION FROM COORDINATE
TRANSFORMATION THEORIES
As mentioned in the earlier section, the engineering and the
connectionist approaches describe how neuronal variables are
encoded and how they are being computed to result in a desired
output during sensorimotor behavior. These two theoretical
frameworks could be useful for characterizing how social vari-
ables are encoded across different brain regions or different
computational stages. For example, highly systematic represen-
tations of social variables would suggest that the region serves a
specific functional purpose using well-defined social quantities
to maximize efficiency. For instance, neurons in the population
might be tuned to social status using a shared encoding principle.
Under this encoding, population average is particularly mean-
ingful (e.g., preferred direction encoding by individual neurons
and population vector averaging for movement direction repre-
sentations; e.g., Georgopoulos et al., 1986). Alternatively, highly
idiosyncratic representations of social variables by a heteroge-
neous population would instead suggest that the social compu-
tations in this region rely on complex non-linear combinations
of signals taking place in a high dimensional space to maximize
flexibility. For example, individual neurons in a population might
encode diverse, seemingly random permutations of social status
information, rendering a standard population pooling problem-
atic. As in the computations of sensorimotor behavior across
different brain areas, it is likely that distinct neural circuits
employ different computational strategies for mediating social
interactions.
COORDINATING SELF- AND OTHER-REFERENCED
REPRESENTATIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL DEFICITS
IN PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
A strikingly large number of neuropsychiatric disorders are
accompanied by social deficits (Insel, 2010; Meyer-Lindenberg
and Tost, 2012). Many of which are believed to be rooted
in an inability to appropriately understand representations of
self and others. Atypical social behaviors in autism (Rogers
and Pennington, 1991; Charman, 2003; Dawson et al., 2004;
Lombardo et al., 2009), schizophrenia (Jeannerod, 2008), bor-
derline personality disorders (Bender and Skodol, 2007), psy-
chopathy (Hare, 1999), among others, seem to have an underlying
impairment in coordinating self and other representations. For
example, deficits in self-referential and other-referential process-
ing in individuals with autism are reflected in an inability of
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) to robustly dif-
ferentiate mentalizing about self and others (Lombardo et al.,
2009). Furthermore, in schizophrenia, many psychotic episodes
are thought to originate from a deficit in monitoring other-
referenced action (other’s behavior) and relating one’s own inten-
tion to self-referenced action (one’s own behavior) (Brune, 2005).
Misalignments in these representations and inabilities to dynami-
cally switch across different reference frames can ultimately result
in deficits in empathy and theory of mind (Brüne and Brüne-
Cohrs, 2006). Depending on the precise type of psychopathology,
such misalignments may be originating from sensory (Lindner
et al., 2005), motor (McIntosh et al., 2006), or motivational and
other cognitive modalities (Chevallier et al., 2012).
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Themodel in Figure 3 generates several testable hypotheses for
social deficits in psychopathological states. Unbalanced self- and
other-regarding preferences may result from overactive or under-
active gain modulations used for transforming agent-nonspecific
signals to either self- or other-referenced signals (G in Figure 3).
They could also result from, or further worsened by, an inabil-
ity to appropriately assign the relative contributions (WS andWO
in Figure 3) of self- and other-regarding motivational variables
for generating a both-referenced representation. Such differential
weighting might be particularly relevant during cooperative inter-
actions in which commonly referenced computations might be
crucial. Empirically testing these and other hypotheses over time
will help validate, refine, or reject the details of the model.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
A successful social interaction requires one to track the behaviors
of oneself as well as the behaviors of another individual, requiring
the brain to integrate both motivational and affective variables
across interacting individuals (Schilbach et al., 2013). In this arti-
cle, I proposed a coordinate transformation approach toward
understanding the neural mechanisms of social interactions. This
approach, borrowed from the sensorimotor tradition, can provide
a computational framework for investigating the representations
of self and others in both healthy and psychopathological brains.
A particular advantage of this approach over others is that the
social coordinate transformation model focuses on how social
variables are encoded by individual neurons, and how such encod-
ing may evolve across different computational stages. Therefore,
the coordinate transformation approach for social interactions
may provide valuable insights into how social information used
within various computational models, such as reinforcement
learning and game theoretic models, is encoded and transformed
across different processing stages. Applied in conjunction with
the reinforcement learning framework, it may be especially use-
ful for revealing how the brain assigns reward outcomes across
different agencies during social interactions. A bright future lies
ahead for social neuroscience. We are now well poised to the
test different social psychological theories by directly investigat-
ing neuralmechanisms. An influential computational scaffold like
the coordinate transformation framework will help advance our
understanding of social cognition, for which the brains of humans
and nonhuman primates have evolved to be specialized.
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